LABARGA, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Spaziano v. Florida Parole Commission, 46 So.3d 576 (1st DCA 2006). In its decision, the district court certified a question of great public importance, which we have rephrased as follows:
See 46 So.3d at 582.
Joseph Spaziano, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Taylor Correctional Institution, is serving a life sentence for "forcible carnal knowledge," a sexual offense, committed in 1975. Under the law in effect when he was sentenced, he is eligible to be considered for parole. In October of 2004, Spaziano filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court of the Second Judicial Circuit challenging the correctness of the Florida Parole Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD). The Florida Parole Commission ("the Commission") determined that Spaziano's PPRD is April 28, 2060.
Spaziano's PPRD of April 28, 2060, was originally determined in 1999. After a hearing before the Commission in 2004, that date was confirmed by the Commission in an order dated February 27, 2004.
Spaziano appealed the circuit court's denial of the writ and the order requiring imposition of a lien on his inmate trust account to the First District Court of Appeal. In its decision, the district court affirmed the denial of the writ, but reversed the circuit court's order imposing a lien on Spaziano's inmate trust account. The district court explained its reasoning for concluding that a challenge to an inmate's PPRD was exempt from the inmate lien requirements of section 57.085 in part as follows:
46 So.3d at 582.
The question of whether section 57.085(10) exempts judicial challenges to the Commission's determination of an inmate's PPRD is a pure question of law; thus, our review is de novo. See D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003) ("The standard of review for the pure questions of law before us is de novo."); Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla.2006) (holding that a question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). Where, as here, the question of law turns on the provisions of a statute, we must first and foremost endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent underlying that statute, which is the polestar that guides us. See, e.g., Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004). In determining the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute, we look first to the text of the provision. See id. Thus, we turn next to an examination of the pertinent provisions of section 57.085. We also review other pertinent provisions of the Florida statutes, as well as our judicial precedent, all of which inform our analysis of the question presented in this case.
Prison inmates are not completely exempt from the payment of court costs and fees for certain legal actions in Florida. The general indigency statute, section 57.081, Florida Statutes (2009), provides a general waiver of prepayment of court costs and fees for persons who are determined to be indigent, but expressly does not apply to prisoners who file or intervene in civil proceedings. See § 57.081(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under section 57.085, known as the "Prisoner Indigency Statute," prepayment of court costs is deferred rather than waived, meaning that an indigent prisoner, if he or she is able, must make an initial partial payment of court costs and fees. A lien is then placed on that inmate's trust account for payment of the remaining costs and fees in monthly installments. See § 57.085(4)-(5), Fla. Stat. Importantly, the act expressly exempts criminal proceedings and collateral criminal proceedings from application of the payment and lien provisions of the
Section 57.085 was enacted in 1996 in an effort to discourage frivolous civil suits by prison inmates. See ch. 96-106, § 2, at 93-95, Laws of Florida. The "Whereas" clauses in the preamble to chapter 96-106 focus on "frivolous" inmate lawsuits and the fact that they "congest civil court dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants." The preamble provides in pertinent part:
Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla.
To effectuate the intent set forth in the preamble, section 57.085 calls upon the circuit court to screen inmate court filings to determine whether the prisoner's action is "frivolous" or falls within the category of civil litigation that the Legislature seeks to discourage by implementation of this law. See § 57.085(9), Fla. Stat. (2009). Those inmate actions found by the circuit court to be frivolous, malicious, or intended to harass may be dismissed. See § 57.085(6), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Actions not found to be frivolous or malicious or otherwise subject to dismissal under the act will proceed, but with the requirement that the prisoner prepay filing fees and related costs or be subject to a lien on his or her inmate trust account.
In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), we considered whether an inmate's petition for writ of mandamus challenging forfeiture of gain time is essentially a collateral criminal proceeding or whether it is a civil proceeding subject to the payment and lien provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute. We concluded that a gain time challenge was analogous to a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10) and was therefore exempt from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085. In so holding, we recognized that section 57.085 was enacted as part of a Legislative effort intended to reduce unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings. Id. at 363; see also Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla.2001) ("The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of frivolous lawsuits and reduce the amount of funds unnecessarily expended on such lawsuits in the courts."). Because gain time challenges, if successful, affect the amount of time a prisoner must spend in prison, we concluded in Schmidt that such challenges were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings.
In arriving at this holding in Schmidt, we also considered the provisions of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) enacted by Congress in 1996. See Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321-66-1321-77 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)). We noted that the PLRA was also intended to discourage filing of frivolous inmate actions, but "the federal courts have concluded that claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences should continue to be treated as traditional collateral criminal proceedings under habeas corpus, since they were not the type of civil lawsuits Congress meant to discourage or restrict." Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 365. The federal courts have held that the PLRA was promulgated by Congress "to curtail prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions litigation" and not the filing of habeas type suits. Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1997).
Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
The next relevant decision in this line of cases is Cox v. Crosby, 27 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In Cox, the First District had for consideration the question of whether Cox's petition for writ of mandamus challenging the constitutionality of a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was exempt from the fee and lien requirements under section 57.085(10). Section 944.275, as amended, precluded Cox from receiving basic gain time. The trial court in Cox held that the action was not exempt from the payment and lien provisions of section 57.085. See id. at 45. Cox sought review in the district court, where the State argued that the holding in Schmidt should be limited to actual gain time forfeitures and not apply to an action challenging a statute. The First District disagreed and concluded that Cox's action was one that is exempt from payment and lien requirements because, if successful, it would directly affect the time that Cox would spend in prison. Cox, 27 So.3d at 46. The district court then certified the following question to this Court in Cox v. Crosby:
Id.
We granted review and rephrased the certified question in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343, 346 (Fla.2008). After specifically limiting the question to all "gain time" actions, we answered it in the affirmative. See id. at 344. In so holding, we determined that "[t]he prisoner indigency statute was intended to supplant the general indigency statute for most purposes where prisoners' civil filings are concerned." Id. at 345. We also concluded that "the prisoner indigency statute was intended to `discourage the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits' with respect to prison conditions." Id. at 348 (quoting Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366). Based on the text and intent of section 57.085 and on our decision in Schmidt, we held in Cox that all gain time actions, including actions challenging a gain time statute, are "collateral criminal proceedings" for the purposes of section 57.085(10), and thus exempt from the payment and lien requirements of the act. Cox, 997 So.2d at 348.
Because the question we answered in Cox was limited to gain time challenges, that decision is not dispositive of the question presented in this case, which pertains to actions challenging the Commission's determination of an inmate's presumptive parole release date. We have never addressed the question now before us concerning whether an action challenging the Commission's determination of an inmate's PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding intended to be exempt from the lien provisions of section 57.085. Thus, we must examine the statutory framework in which the Commission calculates a prisoner's presumptive parole release date and attempt to determine the effect that calculation has on the setting of an inmate's actual parole release date.
The Commission contends that PPRD decisions are so different from gain time challenges that they cannot fall within the exemption set forth in section 57.085(10), and that the rationale of Cox is not applicable to the determination of an inmate's PPRD because that calculation does not alter the stated term of the inmate's original sentence. The Commission further contends that although gain time directly affects the length of an inmate's sentence and is essentially a sentence-related matter, parole decisions are discretionary determinations that are separate and apart from the sentence and from calculation of the length of the sentence. We have considered each of these contentions and find that none of them supports the Commission's contention that section 57.085(10) is inapplicable to actions challenging an inmate's PPRD calculation.
Chapter 947 sets forth the legislative scheme governing parole in this state. We recognize that section 947.002, Florida Statutes (2009), titled "Intent," confirms that parole is not a matter of right, but is one of legislative grace. § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). Even so, an inmate who is entitled to consideration for parole is entitled under chapter 947 to an initial determination by the Commission of a PPRD based on objective guidelines and relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Section 947.172, Florida Statutes (2009), "Establishment of presumptive parole release date," provides that a hearing examiner shall conduct an initial interview with the inmate in preparation for recommending a PPRD to a panel of no fewer than two parole commissioners appointed by the Commission chair. § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat.
We also recognized in Florida Parole & Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985), that although "[p]lacement of the inmate on parole on the date of his presumptive parole release date ... is not automatic," the PPRD "becomes binding on the Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information ... or for good cause in exceptional circumstances." Id. at 819. This is also reflected in section 947.172(3), which provides in pertinent part:
§ 947.172(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). The significance of a properly calculated PPRD is apparent when it is viewed within the statutory scheme for progressing to the next critical step in the parole process, determination of the inmate's "effective parole release date." Section 947.005(5), Florida Statutes (2009), defines "[e]ffective parole release date" as "the actual parole release date as determined by the presumptive parole release date, satisfactory institutional conduct, and an acceptable parole plan." § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Section 947.1745, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to establish the inmate's effective parole release date and provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the inmate's institutional conduct has been satisfactory, the presumptive parole release date shall become the effective parole release date."
While it can be seen that the PPRD is not the final determination of the inmate's parole release date, we cannot ignore the fact that without this first critical step, none of the other statutory steps may be taken on the path to reaching an effective parole release date for the inmate. Unless corrected, errors in determination of the PPRD, such as consideration of improper aggravating circumstances, will necessarily cause the effective parole release date and, if parole is ultimately granted, the actual release date to be delayed.
As we noted in Schmidt, gain time credits "are `one determinant of a petitioner's prison term ... and [his] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.'" Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997)). Similarly, alterations to the calculation of an inmate's PPRD based upon elimination of an erroneous aggravating circumstance in turn alters a prisoner's presumptive parole release date and, thus, alters the effective parole release date, once that determinant is changed.
We therefore conclude that although the PPRD does not determine an inmate's actual parole release date, and while we recognize that parole is not a matter of right, an action challenging the correctness of the PPRD determination can directly affect the length of time that an inmate will spend in prison. Accordingly, challenges to the PPRD do not fall into the category of frivolous or malicious civil actions which the Legislature sought to discourage by the enactment of section 57.085, but are instead analogous to collateral criminal proceedings intended by the Legislature to be exempt from the fee and lien provisions of the act. Such actions fall within the exception expressly set forth by the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for "collateral criminal proceedings." Further, similar to the concern we voiced in Schmidt, to hold otherwise would effectively result in an unlawful "chilling" of a prisoner's right to seek review of the Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release
Spaziano filed his challenge to the Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release date by petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, which is the proper vehicle for challenging such decisions. His challenge was not determined to be frivolous or malicious by the circuit court or the district court, nor do we view it as such. Spaziano's challenge, if successful, would have directly affected his presumptive parole release date and, in turn, his effective parole release date. Because these dates are critical to the calculation of an inmate's parole release date for those inmates who are ultimately granted parole, we conclude that Spaziano's challenge to the PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10). The Legislature has specifically exempted collateral criminal proceedings from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085, and we are not at liberty to ignore this express legislative directive. For these reasons, we approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal vacating the order of the circuit court, which imposed a lien upon Spaziano's trust account.
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court. We hold that inmate challenges, regardless of their nature, to the Florida Parole Commission's determination of an inmate's presumptive parole release date constitute collateral criminal proceedings for the purposes of section 57.085(10). Accordingly, when such an action is brought, section 57.085(10) precludes imposition of a lien on the inmate's trust account to recover applicable filing fees.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
CANADY, C.J., dissenting.
Because a proceeding to challenge the Florida Parole Commission's determination of a presumptive parole release date (PPRD) is not a collateral criminal proceeding, I dissent.
The requirements of the Prisoner Indigency Statute apply generally to any "prisoner who is intervening in or initiating a judicial proceeding." § 57.085(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The only exceptions from the operation of the statutory requirements are for "a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2004). As we have previously recognized, "collateral criminal proceedings" are proceedings "which contest a criminal conviction or sentence." Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla.2001). That is, they are proceedings which involve a collateral attack on the conviction or sentence entered in a criminal case.
A proceeding challenging a parole commission PPRD determination is not a "collateral criminal proceeding." A challenge to a PPRD does not involve a collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence. An attack on a PPRD determination has nothing to do with the validity of the conviction or sentence. "A parole hearing is an administrative proceeding" and "it is not part of a criminal prosecution." State v. Scarlet, 800 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla.2001) (quoting Scarlet v. State, 766 So.2d 1110, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)).
But there is no justification for applying the unambiguous exception for "a collateral criminal proceeding" to a proceeding which is not "a collateral criminal proceeding" but which this Court determines to be "analogous" to such proceedings. Such an "extension by analogy" of a statutory provision "involves creative judicial lawmaking to produce consequences beyond what could reasonably be said to have been intended or communicated" by the statute. 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55:1 (7th ed.2008). This violates "the overarching principle that judges lack the power `to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.'" Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 959 So.2d 176, 182 (Fla.2007) (emphasis removed) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). Although "extension by analogy" is an important part of common law adjudication, it cannot properly be employed as a method of interpreting an unambiguous statutory text. The use of "extension by analogy" in such a context is inconsistent with the respect due to the limits set by the Legislature in the statutory text.
Moreover, legal challenges to PPRD determinations are not analogous to collateral criminal proceedings in the same way that the gain time proceedings at issue in Schmidt were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings. Contrary to the majority's reliance on Schmidt, an attack on a PPRD determination does not challenge a decision by which "the inmate's time in prison is directly affected." Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367. Under the statutory scheme governing parole, an inmate does not have an enforceable right to release based on the PPRD. See Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1985) ("`[T]he use of the terms "guidelines" and "presumptive parole release date" clearly conveys the message that the final parole decision will depend upon the commission's finding that the prisoner meets the conditions provided in section 947.18.' [May v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 435 So.2d 834, 837 (Fla. 1983)].... On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion by the Commission in declining at this time to set an effective parole release date."); see also § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2004) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that the decision to parole an inmate from the incarceration portion of the inmate's sentence is an act of grace of the state and shall not be considered a right.").
Here the majority thus pushes Schmidt's expansion of the statutory exemption for collateral criminal proceedings even beyond the bounds contemplated by Schmidt. The majority's extension of Schmidt's reasoning to the context at issue here illustrates how far the trajectory of Schmidt's reasoning veers away from the governing statutory text. I would return to the text of the statute adopted by the Legislature. Failing to do so results in "an abrogation of legislative power." Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (quoting Am. Bankers
The rewriting of the unambiguous statutory exception in section 57.085(10) is not justified by the majority's assertion that applying the requirements of the Prisoner Indigency Statute to Spaziano would "effectively result in an unlawful `chilling' of a prisoner's right to seek review of the Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release date." 48 So.3d at 723-24. If application of the plain terms of the statute results in a constitutional violation, the constitutionality of the statute should be squarely addressed. Vague assertions of constitutional problems—unaccompanied by any analysis—do not provide a basis for deciding this or any other case.
I therefore would quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and answer the rephrased certified question in the negative.
See Spaziano, 46 So.3d at 582 (certifying by reference the same question certified in Cox v. Crosby, 27 So.3d 45, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), which was restated by this Court to limit the question to gain time challenges and answered in the affirmative in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla.2008)).
